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one cannot assert the interests of another not a party to the litigation, the
Court in previous decisions has relaxed its "self-imposed rule against the
assertion of third-party rights," thereby allowing a party in certain circum-
stances to assert the interests and rights of a non-party." Thus, the Yoder
Court could have determined that the state had standing to represent the rights
of the children in the litigation. Such a holding would have provided a fair
adjudication with respect to all persons ultimately affected by the holding.
Despite the Court's attempts to narrow the scope of the Yoder holding, it
is submitted that the holding may prove to be an uncomfortably broad one for
courts to implement in resolving future free exercise claims asserted against
state compulsory education laws. In expressly stating that its decision in Yoder
is based only upon the unique circumstances the case presents, yet equating a
people's religion with their culture, the Court seems to have plugged up cracks
in the wall while leaving the front door open to first amendment claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The significance of Yoder lies in the fact that the Supreme Court broadened
its first amendment definition of "religion," at least in the instance of the
Amish, to include the complete way of life of a separate minority culture. The
most laudable aspect of the holding is the Court's recognition of the uniqueness
of the Amish plight, in its realization of the distinct threat compulsory educa-
tion laws presented to the Amish as compared with other religious groups.
However, Yoder is suspect for two reasons. First, there is a possibility that
the holding in Yoder may prove to be an uncomfortably broad one for granting
exemptions from attendance laws. The Court's attempts to restrict the scope
of its holding to the Amish alone may prove to be futile in the face of like
claims of other religious minorities. Secondly, the Court's refusal to recognize
that the children's rights were indeed involved in the case raises a possibility
that a significant number of children may be denied a high school education,
contrary to their wishes. In this respect it might be said that Yoder is regres-
sive; for while the rights of Amish parents are broadened, their children may
be subjected to a life chosen for them by another.
Marc H. Folladori
Business Bad Debts: The Vanishing Deduction
The taxpayer, president of a closely-held construction company, had origin-
ally invested $38,900 to establish his business with his son-in-law. The tax-
payer received a $12,000 annual salary for obtaining bank financing and
securing bid and performance bonds for the company's construction contracts.
5'See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444 (1972). In Eisenstadt the Court found
that a lecturer who had given a woman student a contraceptive and thereby violated Massa-
chusetts law had standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons who had no access to
contraceptives. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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The underwriters of these bonds required the taxpayer and his son-in-law to
sign a blanket indemnity agreement which protected the underwriters from
any loss sustained as a result of the bonding. Two significant defaults occurred
for which a $162,000 indemnification was paid by the taxpayer. As the con-
struction company was thereafter in bankruptcy receivership, the taxpayer was
unable to recoup his losses from the company. The taxpayer then deducted the
amount of the loss incurred as a business bad debt under section 166 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' The Internal Revenue Commissioner, in disallowing
the deduction, ruled that the loss did not give rise to a business bad debt.' The
refund claim was tried in federal district court and the jury returned a verdict
for the taxpayer.' The Government appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, but the jury verdict for the taxpayer was affirmed on the basis that
the debt need only be "significantly motivated by the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness." The Supreme Court granted certiorari2 to resolve a conflict among the
circuits.' Held, reversed and remanded, with direction that judgment be entered
for the United States: In determining whether a bad debt has a proximate re-
lationship to the taxpayer's trade or business and thus qualifies as a business
bad debt, the proper standard is that of dominant rather than significant
motivation. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
I. TREATMENT OF WORTHLESS DEBTS
The significance of the distinction between a business bad debt and a non-
business bad debt is in the treatment of the debt for purposes of income tax-
ation. The losses incurred in a business bad debt are treated as ordinary losses
which are subject to practically full deduction from ordinary income.7 A non-
business bad debt is treated as a short-term capital loss with very limited de-
ductions.' In section 166 the losses considered are those which are not evidenced
by a security. Section 165 (g) ( 1 ) encompasses losses evidenced by securities
which, if held for more than six months, are treated as long-term capital
losses!
In 1942, an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, section
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 166.
'This bad debt was ruled to be a loss not attributable to the taxpayer's trade or business,
governed by the limitations of id. § 166(d) (2). The loss was treated as a loss from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for not more than 6 months under id. §§ 1211, 1212.
'Charge to the Jury, Generes v. United States, Civil No. 16156 (E.D. La., Aug. 24,
1967), 67-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9 9754.4 United States v. Generes, 427 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1970), quoting Weddle v.
Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1963).
'United States v. Generes, 401 U.S. 972 (1971).
6Corpare Weddle v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1963), with Niblock v.
Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969), which adopted the Government's test of
dominant motivation.
This is true even when the loss exceeds income for the year, due to the provisions of
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 172, which establishes procedures for carrybacks and carryovers.
Illustrations of manipulations of net operating losses, carrybacks, and carryovers are set
forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.172-4 (1965). If a net operating loss is not absorbed in the
taxable year in which it is created, then the loss can be carried back to the three immediately
preceding taxable years, and, if not absorbed by the income of those years, it is then carried
over for as many as five years following the year of the loss.
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 166(d) (1) (B), 1211, 1212.
9
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 5 4.09(2) (3d ed. 1971).
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23(k), was enacted to establish the bad debts section for those losses not
evidenced by a security." This section was introduced as a means of minimizing
the revenue losses attributable to the practice of deducting from ordinary
income "loans" to friends and relatives which were actually intended as gifts.
Such "loans" are given nonbusiness bad debt status." For the more preferential
treatment of a business bad debt, there must be a proximate relationship to
the taxpayer's trade or business. '
The first cases considering the applicability of section 166 were concerned
with the distinctions between a section 166 bad debt and a section 165 loss.
In Putnam v. Commissioner the Court held that the discharge of an obligation
as guarantor of notes of a corporation was not a loss "incurred in [a] trans-
action . . . for profit,"'3 but rather was a nonbusiness bad debt. This case
recognized the mutually exclusive features of sections 165 and 166: "The
making of the specific provision as to debts indicates that these were to be
considered as a special class and that losses on debts were not to be regarded
as falling under the preceding general provision.""
The distinctions between a business and a nonbusiness bad debt received
major consideration in Whipple v. Commissioner." The Court, citing Putnam,
determined that the deductibility of a business bad debt turned upon its proxi-
mate connection with activities which were recognized in tax law as a trade or
business, "a concept which falls far short of reaching every income or profit
making activity."' " As a consequence of this narrow interpretation of section
166, post-Whipple cases allowed only a nonbusiness bad debt deduction in
many situations."
II. MOTIVATION IN THE CREATION OF BAD DEBTS
Although the Whipple decision laid down the "proximate relationship"
test, there remained the question of what motivation must be shown in the
creation of the debt to achieve proximate relationship with the taxpayer's trade
or business. A split of authority developed over this question.
One view was built on the concept of proximate cause as developed in tort
" Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(k), 56 Stat. 820 (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,§ 166).
'
1 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 166(d) (2), defines a nonbusiness bad debt as, "a debt
other than- (A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a
trade or business of the taxpayer; or (B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which
is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business."
'2H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-78 (1942), sets forth a proximate
relationship test with the taxpayer's trade or business as the determining criterion for a busi-
ness bad debt. The language of that report was substantially incorporated into Treas. Reg.
S 1.166-5(b) (2) (1959).
13352 U.S. 82 (1956).
I4 d. at 87.
'3 373 U.S. 193 (1963). The taxpayer's investment activities in several corporations did
not satisfy the burden of demonstrating that he was engaged in a trade or business. The
Court found that investing is not a trade or business and the taxpayer's return on those in-
vestments, though substantially the product of his services, legally arises not from his own
trade or business, but from that of the corporation.
16Id. at 201.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Byck, 325 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1963); Eugene H. Rietzke,
40 T.C. 433 (1963).
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law.'" The Second Circuit, in Weddle v. Commissioner," determined that proxi-
mate causation as developed in tort law meant that a cause contributing to a
harm may be found proximate despite the fact that it might have been second-
ary to another contributing cause." The proximate relationship standard
established by Whipple, with the analogy to tort law, meant that where the
creation of a debt was sufficiently motivated by the taxpayer's trade or business,
even though a non-qualifying motivation also existed, the deduction as a
business debt was allowed. The Weddle court was not unanimous in its reason-
ing. Although concurring with the result, Chief Judge Lumbard recognized
that when a taxpayer has the dual status of corporate employee and stock-
holder, the significant motivation test would always allow a business bad debt
deduction. The court in Whipple had specifically warned the courts to take
great care to "distinguish bad debt losses arising from [the taxpayer's] own
business and those actually arising from activities peculiar to an investor con-
cerned with, and participating in, the conduct of the corporate business."'"
Although not citing the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Lumbard, the
Seventh Circuit in Niblock v. Commissioner" followed his reasoning. The
Niblock court disagreed with the majority in Weddle and upheld the dominant
and primary motivation test" as the only test which would inject sufficient
certainty into the interpretation of section 166 to comply with the admonition
of Whipple.' Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit did not elucidate their
argument in favor of the dominant and primary motivation test as the Second
Circuit had with the significant motivation test in Weddle. As a consequence
the Fifth Circuit in Generes was impressed with the Weddle majority opinion.
The split of the circuits forced the Supreme Court to resolve the motivation
issue.
III. UNITED STATES V. GENERES
In a six-to-one decision, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Blackmun, adopted the dominant and primary motivation test established by
the Seventh Circuit in Niblock. The overriding factual consideration for the
Court was whether the debt centered on the taxpayer's business interest in the
"See Millsap v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1968); Odee Smith, 55 T.C.
260 (1970). The tax court in Smith preferred the primary motivation test of the Seventh
Circuit, but, following the law of the circuit in which this particular case arose, applied the
significant motivation test approved by the Fifth Circuit in Generes. Most courts avoided a
specific standard determining proximity as the taxpayer's motivation either met or failed
under both standards. See, e.g., Stratmore v. United States, 420 F.2d 461 (3d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1971); Lundgren v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 623 (9th Cit.
1967); United States v. Clark, 358 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1966); Kelly v. Patterson, 331 F.2d
753 (5th Cir. 1964).
19325 F.2d 849 (2d Cit. 1963).
"Old. at 851.
" 373 U.S. at 202.
"417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969).
"'The dominant and primary motivation test allows the taxpayer only one status in
each situation. The test considers what overriding reason the taxpayer had for incurring the
obligation. Non-qualifying motivations, nonbusiness in nature, are permissible, but only to
the extent that they played a secondary role in the creation of the debt. In Malat v. Riddell,
383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966), the Supreme Court had previously defined primarily to mean
"principally" or "of first importance."
"4417 F.2d at 1187.
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corporation as an employee, or on his nonbusiness interest in his corporate
investment as a shareholder.' By phrasing the question in this manner, the
Court exposed one of the crucial weaknesses of the significant motivation test.
When a taxpayer has the status of both employee and investor, the significant
motivation test will always allow the business debt deduction, unless the
business interest is inconsequential. Therefore, the distinction between the dif-
ferent types of debt is blurred by the use of significant motivation. Although
neither was considered controlling, both Putnam and Whipple were examined
by the Court to determine previous Court views of section 166. The cases were
said to "indicate ... a cautious and not a free-wheeling approach to the busi-
ness bad debt.""
The Court's opinion specifically sets out the reasons for the application of
the dominant motivation test as the proper measure for business bad debt
qualifications. It is important to give each reason some consideration as this
decision marks the first time the dominant motivation test was fully examined
under section 166.
First, the Court noted that a careful distinction has been made in the Code
between business and nonbusiness items." The significant motivation test
clearly obliterated that distinction when a taxpayer had a dual status. It allowed
the preferred business deduction even when nonbusiness motivations predomi-
nated, if the business motivation was also significant. Thus, the significant
motivation test had allowed secondary considerations to govern the tax con-
sequences.
Second, the Court had previously encouraged the enforcement of the busi-
ness-nonbusiness distinction in Whipple. The significant motivation test cir-
cumscribed the Whipple concept that a shareholder's role did not constitute a
trade or business and was not to be given business status.
Third, the attributes of the dominant motivation standard were considered.
Unlike significant motivation, this standard injected the elements of workability
and certainty. In distinguishing between investment and business, the trier of
fact "may compare the risk against the potential reward and give proper em-
phasis to the objective rather than to the subjective."' The scales may be so
balanced between the competing interests of dual status that to obtain the
preferential tax treatment the business interest must be of first importance.
Fourth, under section 262 of the Code, no deduction is to be allowed for
personal, living, or family expenses." The significant motivation test circum-
scribed this provision by allowing personal nonbusiness debts to be deducted.
Fifth, the Court observed the similarities between section 166 and section
165. Losses deductible under section 165 (c) (1) must be incurred in a trade
or business.' Previous circuit court decisions had clearly indicated that in de-
25405 U.S. at 100 (1972). As both a shareholder and an employee, the taxpayer had
both business and nonbusiness interests. The business interest arose out of the taxpayer's
status as an employee. The shareholder status could only result in a nonbusiness interest due
to the doctrine announced in Whipple. See notes 15-16 supra, and accompanying text.
21Id. at 103.
' Id.
2' Id. at 104.
29 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 262.
" Id. § 165(c) (1).
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termining the deductibility of a section 165 loss, the primary motive must be
ascertained and given effect."' Although the Government had urged only sig-
nificant motivation in other areas, such as liability for the accumulated earnings
tax' and includability of a transfer made in contemplation of death in the
gross estate,' there was no inconsistency in urging the use of the dominant
motivation test for business bad debts in view of the use of the dominant
motivation standard under section 165. This application indicates that tax tests
are to be applied independently, but relative to the specific problems involved
in a similar section or series of sections.
As a final reason for establishing the dominant motivation test, the Court
attacked the tort law analogy which some courts had used in applying the
significant motivation test. Tort law deals with different factors. Duty and
foreseeability are clearly distinct from the tax problems encountered in as-
certaining deduction status. As Chief Judge Lumbard had noted in his concur-
rence in Weddle, "[tlo import notions of proximate causation distilled from the
great body of tort law into consideration of §166 is of little value, because
factors such as time, space, and foreseeability... are by their nature incapable
of application to a problem which requires dissection of different motivations
toward a similar objective.""M
The Generes case does leave one question unanswered: What evidence will
be needed to allow the fact-finder to approve the business debt status? The
majority of the Court simply ruled that the evidence did not support a verdict
for the taxpayer under a dominant motivation standard. Therefore, a judgment
n.o.v. was ordered for the United States.
Ordinarily the simple finding that there was no evidence to support a verdict
would not be controversial. However, in Generes the taxpayer testified that
he was solely motivated by the protection of his employee status. Although
two Justices dissented from the judgment n.o.v.,' the majority found that the
taxpayer's statements were self-serving and to be given no evidentiary weight
while standing alone. However, in this case, the taxpayer's statements did not
stand alone, but rather were submitted along with the monetary data of the
taxpayer's salary, investment, and loss. Although these figures did not totally
support the taxpayer's statements that he never once thought of his corporate
investment when incurring the debt, there was enough evidence to allow a new
trial under the standard of dominant motivation. Although this is a stricter
standard than the significant motivation standard, by rendering a verdict for
the Government, the Court has moved beyond the bounds of their own defini-
tion of dominant and primary. By imposing strict evidentiary requirements on
" See, United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963); Imbesi v. Commissioner,
361 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1966); Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962);
Arata v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1960); ct. Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278 (1960).2 INT. REy. CODE of 1954, § 531.
mid. § 2035.
325 F.2d at 852.
'1405 U.S. at 112-13. (White & Brennan, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
These two Justices agreed with the dominant and primary motivation standard established
by the majority decision, but disagreed with the judgment n.o.v., instead maintaining that
the case should have been remanded for a new trial. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented with
the majority opinion in its entirety. Id. at 113-16.
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the dominant motivation test, the Court has in effect moved to a sole motiva-
tion test; i.e., if a non-qualifying motivation is present, the business deduction
is lost. At least two Justices felt that the taxpayer "has never had an oppor-
tunity to be heard, after it is determined that his verdict cannot stand, as to
whether factual issues remain on which he is entitled to a new trial.""' The
taxpayer carried his burden of proof according to the significant motivation
test. With the imposition of a new test, he should again be allowed to present
further evidence which would be measured by the new standard.
In a subtle area such as motivation, mere figures of a taxpayer's salary,
investment, and loss do not give the clearest picture. A taxpayer's own testi-
mony may be necessary as an interpreting measure. It would then be left to
the Government to rebut such testimony. Simply to say that a taxpayer's state-
ments are self-serving, and to be given little or no evidentiary weight, robs
the taxpayer of a most important consideration; the opportunity to establish
his own priorities in his financial affairs. The circumstances surrounding the
creation of the debt may belie the taxpayer's statements, but this is a question
for the fact-finder to evaluate in light of the dominant motivation test.
Undoubtedly the Generes decision imposes a greater weight on the taxpayer
to show that his employment status dominantly prevailed in his debt consider-
ations. The judgment n.o.v. section is an indication to such taxpayers and their
attorneys that greater corroborating testimony will be necessary for the dual
status employee-shareholder to achieve a business bad debt deduction. In view
of these considerations, it is evident that the possibility of a business bad debt
deduction for many dual status taxpayers is vanishing by judicial interpretation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Each time the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to consider the busi-
ness bad debts section, the taxpayer has found it increasingly difficult to obtain
this ordinary loss deduction. Whipple attempted to establish a strict division
between business and nonbusiness roles. The dominant and primary motivation
test applied by Generes is the only standard which is consistent with the
Whipple decision because it imposes greater objectivity in determining the
division between these roles, and consequently the status of the debt arising
from the roles. It should be recognized that, in addition to the dominant moti-
vation test, the Court is expecting greater corroboration of the business moti-
vation. Much greater attention is placed on the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the debt.
In accepting the greater burden on the taxpayer, the courts should also
recognize that the dual status employee-shareholder is caught in the middle.
Whipple and Generes only establish a division between business and non-
business bad debts; this is not to say that business bad debt status is eliminated
simply because a nonbusiness interest also exists. When a dual status exists,
there is still clearly a business interest in the corporation through the employ-
ment, which should be recognized if it is dominant in the taxpayer's debt con-
siderations. Investment status by its nature covers a period of years, while
16 1d. at 112.
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